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Vera Brittain’s Testaments of Labor, Work, and 
Action 
Austin Riede 
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said:

“If you don’t work, you die.”

--Rudyard Kipling,

“The Gods of the Copybook Headings” (1919)
	
Vera Brittain’s Testament of Youth (1933), a memoir of her childhood and experience 
as a Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) nurse in the First World War, offers valuable 
insight into the ways in which the war changed the conditions, representations, 
and political implications of English women’s labor. Throughout the memoir’s 
three sections, Brittain retrospectively explores what her own labor meant, both 
in personally coming to terms with her exceptional losses (her fiancé, brother, and 
two close friends were killed in the war) and with women’s larger political and 
cultural position in England. Despite its centrality to Testament of Youth, however, 
few scholars have engaged with Brittain’s representations of labor. In this essay, I 
will argue that Testament of Youth importantly exemplifies the three categories of 
labor, work, and action Hannah Arendt would later define in The Human Condition
(1958), specifically illuminating how they applied to English women’s experiences 
in the years surrounding the war. Furthermore, Brittain’s memoir engages such 
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80 IJCS 
categories in a more sophisticated, if indirect and ambivalent manner, than has yet 
been acknowledged. Testament of Youth demonstrates how, through constantly 
attempting to distill a philosophy of labor that would sustain her through the war, 
Brittain transforms from a prewar provincial “pretty-pretty” (116), being groomed 
for marriage and constrained by an Edwardian bourgeois community of constant 
surveillance, to a fiercely independent political activist. What is most remarkable 
about this metamorphosis is the extent to which she presents her personal history of 
trauma and recovery as mapped onto national/international political narratives, and 
what her commitment to education, voluntary nursing, and ultimately the League 
of Nations, suggests about the modern connections among the English subject, 
state power, and individuality. 
Testament of Youth was published in 1933, eight years after the period it docu-
ments ended. By 1925, Brittain felt that she was on her way to a new life with 
new friends, a family, and a career. With few remaining acquaintances to share in 
the memory of a life that ended for her with the war, she felt the need to revisit 
a past that was increasingly cut off from the comforts and relative fulfillment of 
middle age. She writes in the foreword that she had wanted “with a growing sense 
of urgency” to write about her war experience for nearly a decade (11). After mak-
ing several aborted attempts at fictionalizing her story or adapting her diaries, she 
decided only a memoir would accurately express the lived changes she wanted to 
convey. She wrote Testament of Youth largely by re-visiting and connecting disparate 
entries from past diaries and letters to and from her family and friends. She writes: 
I wanted to give […] an impression of the changes which that 
period brought about in the minds and lives of very different 
groups of individuals belonging to the large section of middle-
class society from which my own family comes. 
Only, I felt, by some such attempt to write history in terms of 
personal life could I rescue something that might be of value, 
some element of truth and hope and usefulness, from the smash-
ing up of my own youth by the war. (11) 
This attempt to salvage some kind of use value from the war is a recurring theme 
in the memoir. Brittain wants to demonstrate that, even if what she has written 
“constitutes, in effect, the indictment of a civilisation,” the war, and the labor and 
lives that were sacrificed for it, will still have use-value for that indicted civilization 
if it will learn from its past (12). The terms of the memoir’s ambivalence toward 
the war are thus clearly set. As I will demonstrate, ambivalence colors nearly every 
aspect of Brittain’s engagement with work, labor, and action. 
Most criticism of Testament of Youth has focused on Brittain’s feminism and/or 
her coming to terms with her losses through the process of writing. Accounts of 
Brittain’s feminism generally focus on its apparent paradoxes or inconsistencies, 
from Susan Leonardi’s critique of Brittain’s willed ignorance of Winifred Holtby’s 
lesbian desire and her frantic imposition of heteronormativity on both her best friend 
and her text, to Meg Albrinck’s more nuanced reading of how Brittain needed to 
       	
 
 
 
         
            
          
             
            
           
              
         
 
          
 Riede 81 
inhabit (in de Certeauvian terms) and render habitable the off-limits space of war 
experience to present her feminist perspective on the war. Although the arena of 
labor has not been a focal point for understanding how Brittain constituted her 
feminism, Brittain significantly cites Olive Schreiner’s Woman and Labour as one 
of the formative texts of her feminism. She writes that she “can still tingle with 
[…] excitement” on reading the passage that begins “We take all labour for our 
province!” (41, emphasis in original). This passage inspires her as she repeatedly 
confronts her father’s injunctions that she should prepare for marriage and forget 
her ideas of going to Oxford. Moreover, it is only because Roland Leighton, her 
future fiancé and fellow Schreiner devotee, tells her that he has been a feminist 
ever since he realized that his mother’s income from writing novels helped pay for 
his education, that she becomes really interested in him (84). 
Brittain’s philosophical and physical engagements with labor shape her mourning 
as much as they shape her feminism. Much scholarship has focused on the nexus 
of autobiographical form and trauma, asserting that Brittain’s book grapples pri-
marily with the subjectivity of the dead. Victoria Stewart posits, for example, that 
Brittain’s book “testif[ies] on behalf of” her dead companions (28). In a similar, 
if more psychoanalytic, reading Richard Badenhausen reads the text as a kind of 
talking cure for trauma. Badenhausen posits that through her memoir’s method of 
pastiche, which creates a (male) community of the dead amongst whom Brittain can 
converse, she is able to escape a state of Freudian melancholia and finally “break 
faith with the dead” enough to move on (247). By ignoring Brittain’s presentation 
of her relationship to her labor as a volunteer nurse behind the lines during the 
war, her work at Oxford as a student and writer, and her postwar action as a politi-
cal speaker for the League of Nations, these readings risk reducing her to a mere 
mourner. I argue that the community Brittain needed she found for herself, not in 
imagined communications with dead men, as is commonly assumed, but by first 
cultivating her own subjectivity, a radical move for a provincial young woman of 
her generation, and then moving, in Arendtean terms, from the unrewarding and 
thoughtless condition of labor, through the self-making condition of work, and 
finally to a relative freedom in action, that inter-human, communal condition that 
creates mutual recognition and progress. 
Far from passive pastiche, Brittain’s personally invested postwar action during 
the early twenties presents an alternative to Britain’s postwar paralytic conversation 
among the fragments of a ruined civilization and its mania for creating countless but 
futile memorials to the war’s dead while exhibiting veiled hostility for its survivors. 
While the cosmopolitanism of much postwar modernism (e.g., Pound’s The Cantos
and Eliot’s The Waste Land) self-consciously and almost dissemblingly seems to 
work, so it can self-consciously fail, to make the fragments of a lost European order 
cohere, or, to find cultural identity in England’s deep, mythic history (as in Mary 
Butts’Taverner novels, and Virginia Woolf’s later fiction) Brittain’s internationalist 
action is dedicated to forging a coherent community of nations.[i]
Brittain moves through these various stages of social engagement alongside ac-
celeration in the transformation of traditional state power into biopower, according 
to Michel Foucault, a process underway since the eighteenth century (Reid 127); 
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if Brittain’s internationalism never quite breaks the ideological boundaries of 
this modern paradigm of state power, it at least pushes up against them. Giorgio 
Agamben points to the First World War as the period in which, through the exercise 
of the “state of exception” across Europe, state sovereignty’s basis in biopower 
became apparent (7). The war was a crucible for the biopolitical model of power, 
a crucible within which biopower was strengthened by devising what Julian Reid 
has defined as “strategies” of control over the “natural body” (129-134). Brittain’s 
personal experiences in the war reflected the changes that the war compelled in 
England’s biological control over its subjects: the conflict demanded a disciplinary 
demonstration of the sovereign’s power of life or death over its subjects—the old 
paradigm of sovereignty elaborated by Hobbes—through direct state interven-
tions into the biological existence of its subjects. The Defence of the Realm Act
(1914), for example, granted unprecedented executive powers. The Conscription 
Act (1916) demanded total corporeal control of male subjects on threat of death. 
It also produced, however, more diffuse mechanisms to preserve its sovereignty 
and the life and well-being of the English “race” at the social and biological level. 
The aspect of this biopoliticization of state power that is most important in regards 
to Brittain’s development and recovery, however, is that, as Foucault explains, 
biopower relies on “techniques oriented toward individuals and intended to rule 
them in a continuous and permanent way” (Power 300). Through the self-care 
encouraged by the postwar environment, Brittain finally accepts what had been to 
her the unacceptable conditions of her subjectivity and moves beyond her justified 
but futile anger against the state and culture for which she had sacrificed everything. 
She becomes, once again, an engaged state subject and an object of direct power, 
doing what she is told. This subjectification, which she recognizes as inhering in 
not only herself, but also her entire culture, marked the end of an age. 
i. Work and Subjectivity 
Brittain’s initial description of her late Victorian/Edwardian provincial childhood 
is unsurprising: she describes her childhood home as representative of “all that 
was essentially middle-class in that Edwardian decade” (23). She was naïve and 
sheltered. She was, as far as she knew, the only person interested in the larger 
world outside her provincial town, and evidently terrified by some unnameable 
presence lurking in the apparent safety of dreary Buxton. Her numerous childhood 
terrors “of thunder, of sunsets, of the full moon, of the dark, of standing under 
railway arches or crossing bridges over noisy streams, of the end of the world and 
of the devil waiting to catch me round the corner” (24) seem directly connected 
to the random “tempestuous explosion[s]” (23) from her father and the patriarchal 
power structure that pervaded her community and acted as a constant surveillance 
mechanism over her subjectivity and her body. One source of these fears is dis-
tinctly her failure to appropriately recognize male privilege: when, “at the age of 
five or six” a nursemaid heard her call her brother Edward a “’Little fool!’” the 
maid told her “’There, you’ve done it! Now you’ll go to hell!’” (24). But the fears 
she recalls are mostly not of substantial things, or of frightening acts; she fears 
the images that would have saturated, like patriarchal power, her childhood. The 
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constraints on her subjectivity as a provincial Edwardian girl are omnipresent, 
invisible in their ubiquity, inscribed in everything around her and even directly 
onto her body. Reflecting on the freedom of the interwar years, she writes “I am 
seized with an angry resentment against the conventions of twenty years ago, which 
wrapped up my comely adolescent body in woolen combinations, black cashmere 
stockings, ‘liberty’ bodice, dark stockinette knickers, flannel petticoat [etc.]” (34). 
With the psychological insight she has gleaned in the postwar years, and which 
she continually draws on as an article of faith, Brittain is able to look back at her 
childhood and teenage years and see how the omnipresent and crushing structure 
of paternalist control inhibited her subjective development. Sartorial constraints 
function, at the level of the body, to perpetuate the larger constraints and surveil-
lance with which Brittain must struggle. 
The Edwardian community and family structure was devised to prevent the 
subject from recognizing and constituting itself through the personal work that, 
in engaging the world, constitutes the self. Recalling her feelings after moving in 
with Winifred Holtby in 1920, she writes: 
There had been no privacy in Victorian or Edwardian childhood, 
and from the age of thirteen to twenty-seven, I seemed to have 
lived in public. At school I had gone to bed and got up in dormi-
tories […], read and worked in the company of others; nothing 
perhaps is still so oppressive in traditional boarding school life 
as the inability of a boy or girl ever to be quite alone. […] No 
member of that pre-war provincial “set” could hope to live to 
herself even if adult, and local and family searchlights had played 
continuously upon the dearest hopes, the most intimate relation-
ships of every young person. (546-7) 
This reflection is possible because conditions changed after the war. Brittain’s 
description presents a tension in that this surveillance is “still so oppressive” and 
that it was the particular burden of the “pre-war provincial set.” The deep moral 
structures that had kept surveillance over the early lives of the bourgeoisie had been 
attenuated by the experience of war and generational alienation. The war thus colors 
Brittain’s description of Victorian/Edwardian childhood—the communal vigilance 
of the family structure scrutinizes the subject with “searchlights”—metaphorically 
indicating the war “just beneath the surface of peace” that Foucault suggested may 
be the foundation of power (“Society” 47). 
Likewise, even in her courting with Roland, the two hardly ever had any time 
to themselves, as “the whole series of complicated relationships leading from 
acquaintance to engagement had to be conducted in public or not at all” (120). 
Such a carceral social structure insures the conformity that was necessary for the 
war to last as it did, and inexorable scrutiny prevented the discussion of what Ford 
Madox Ford, in his pre-war ethnography of England, called “things,” i.e., politics, 
religion, sexuality, etc. (England 312). Not being able openly to discuss any of 
these things inhibits the formation of individual, self-analytic subjectivity. Even 
Brittain’s youthful aspirations, such as “to extend love, to promote thought, […] 
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to combat indifference, to inspire activity” and “to know everything of something 
and something of everything,” forged in this provincial obscurity, are, as she rec-
ognizes, so vague as to be hollow clichés (43). 
Furthermore, this early training in conformity impels a universal acceptance 
of the war’s worthiness and an inability to question, publicly or privately, its use 
value. Throughout her growth, this stays with Brittain, metamorphically, and 
gives her later anti-war sentiment a strange tension with what she always wants to 
believe—that there is yet some redeemable glory in war, or in the sacrifices that 
she and her friends made for it. Though disillusioned, she still asserts the value of 
her sacrifice. For instance, she affirms that “it had concrete results in stupendous 
patience, in superhuman endurance, in the constant re-affirmation of incredible 
courage” (370). She is always ambiguous about how these results should be valued, 
given their concreteness but also their having been for a wrong cause. Similarly, 
her Edwardian upbringing still marks the politically activist journalist and novelist 
of the twenties and thirties; when looking for an apt quotation, Longfellow “will 
insist upon ousting A.E. Housman and Siegfried Sassoon” (26).
Brittain’s desire to go to Oxford, an idiosyncrasy frowned upon as much by her 
community as by her parents, was an overt rebellion and insistence on her individu-
ality that was both psychological and political. The social wrong Brittain commits 
in wanting to be a student is to demonstrate interest in her self, in who she might 
be, and, what she might, independently, do. In Arendtean terms, this first section of 
the memoir documents Brittain’s overwhelming desire for work, to take part in the 
process of shaping the artificial, human made world (Arendt 36), and thereby to shape 
her own subjectivity and retrieve from patriarchal power and make use of “the time 
that she [was] not qualified to use” (Brittain 51).Although she already has clear ideas 
about the kind of social life she wants to have, Brittain is clearly here concerned first 
and foremost with that philosophical essential that Foucault describes as “the care 
of the self” (Foucault Sexuality). The ancient Greek ideal Foucault describes is that 
the subject should relate him or herself to him or herself as subject, a self-reflection 
that ideally results in a state in which “not only is one satisfied with what one is and 
accepting of one’s limits, but one ‘pleases oneself.’ […] It is defined by the fact of 
not being caused by anything that is independent of ourselves and therefore escapes 
our control. It arises out of ourselves and within ourselves” (Foucault Sexuality 66). 
Although Brittain strives after this cultivation of self in her first year at Oxford, it 
will not be until she returns, after the war, that she will recognize that, to some ex-
tent, in aspiring after the work of a student, she has traded in the fetters of one set of 
social restrictions and regulations for another. The cultivated circles of the educated 
she once aspired after are not, necessarily, cultivated individual selves as much as 
representative of a conformist culture of cultivation. 
Notwithstanding, Brittain’s achievement in winning a scholarship at Somerville 
is considerable, but after the tremendous difficulty of arriving at a place in which 
she might attend to her own subjectivity unimpaired by the constant scrutiny of 
provincial middle-class expectations, the demands of the larger national commu-
nity rear up. She is almost immediately overwhelmed by the conflict between her 
desire to stay at Oxford and what she perceives as the need to join the war effort. 
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Both her lover and her brother having already signed up compound this need. She 
desires to remain close to these progressive young men who have, thus far, stood 
with her in her determination to develop and look to the independent subjectivity 
they have valued. Thus torn between “learning” or “life,” and interrupted in her 
struggle toward independence, Brittain spends a period of philosophical stagnation 
unable to commit to either, “riding [her] bicycle about the hills and dales, fever-
ishly inventing analogies and distinctions between life and death, soul and intellect, 
spirit and immortality” (138). When she can bear this no longer, she revealingly 
writes to Roland Leighton: 
I remember once at the beginning of the War […] you described 
college as ‘a secluded life of scholastic vegetation.’That is just what 
it is. It is, for me at least, too soft a job.... I want physical endurance; 
I should welcome the most wearying kinds of bodily toil. (140)
Brittain thus flies to labor in the face of the realization that the putative philosophi-
cal claims of civilization mask civilization’s emptiness, at best, or mendacious, 
murderous greed, at worst. Such realizations characterize much of the literature of 
modernism. Brittain is consistently torn in this memoir between her idealistic belief 
in the value of the sacrifices her generation is called on to make, and the realization 
that those sacrifices were unnecessary and only advanced the materialist needs of a 
moribund empire. The narration is almost impressionist in its vacillation between 
a belief in the glorious rhetoric of the early war years and moral condemnation of 
the war’s pointlessness. Her memoir derives enormous tension from the desire to 
use the grand and archaic language that Paul Fussell associates with the early years 
of the war, and the realization that such noble pieties mask ignoble corruption (21). 
The idealism of labor to which she turns in a moment of moral confusion func-
tions much like that of Ford Madox Ford’s Christopher Tietjens, in his Parade’s 
End tetralogy (1924-8). Tietjens conceives his military service as an opportunity 
to give himself “clean bones” and get rid of the moral complexities the war and 
modern sexuality present (236). This chance to find herself, free of the ambigu-
ity and anguish of political thought, is precisely what Brittain’s mind-consuming 
years of intensive labor will offer—an end to ineffectual musings and the sure 
knowledge nursing brings that she is certainly not doing the wrong thing in the 
face of such destruction. The flight to hard labor, however, is necessary because 
of the double bind that life at Oxford during wartime, with loved ones at the front, 
presents. Brittain must, ideologically, support the war that she sees destroying all 
she cares about, but to remain in a state of reflection may challenge her entrenched 
Buxton beliefs too thoroughly before she has properly cultivated and invented an 
independent subjectivity. She turns to arduous labor, therefore, for precisely the 
opposite of that which she sought in the work of a student. The art of attending 
to the individual self is fundamentally Appollonian in its inward-focused and ra-
tional discipline. But Brittain turns, in an odd twist of the Nietzschean paradigm, 
to the Dionysian exaltation not of thoughtless revelry within a larger group, but 
of unthinking sacrifice in physically laboring for the group effort of the war. She 
becomes a nurse to efface, rather than to cultivate, the self. 
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ii. Labor and Maternity 
While fitting into the patriarchal bourgeoisie had been totally limiting, and con-
structing subjectivity in the arena of work was now morally unthinkable, Brittain 
gives herself over to the hard physical labor, and immediate personal danger, of 
becoming a VAD nurse, who is assigned to hospitals in Britain, Malta, and France. 
Because this work is so closely linked to the men by whom Brittain partially defines 
herself, it actually helps to preserve the patriarchal order at the level of the male 
body through a maternal resignation of her powers and abilities to the labor of 
nursing. This service corresponds to Arendt’s definition of labor, both producing 
equilibrium in Brittain’s life through the constant repetition of Sisyphean acts which 
must be completed for consumption (the return to active service) rather than any 
permanent addition to culture, and in its social construction as a maternal activity. 
Arendt’s justification for breaking with Marx and his followers in her distinction 
between work and labor lies partly in that “every European language, ancient and 
modern, contains two etymologically unrelated words for what we have come to 
think of as the same activity” (80) and in the fundamental contradiction in Marx’s 
admission that labor had value in its reification and Marxism’s promise to eradicate 
that valuable labor (102). For Arendt, labor is distinguished from work because it 
simply reproduces ephemeral products for consumption, rather than adding in some 
permanent way to the larger structures of the human-made world. To Arendt, the 
term animal laborans correctly describes the condition of the human at labor. He 
or she is merely creating the conditions for subsistence at a physical level—labor 
is not social, its results are not lasting, and it is the arena in which humans produce 
existence out of the given world rather than shaping it. 
Another aspect of Arendt’s philological distinction between labor and work is 
that in the European languages the equivalent of the word labor, and not work, is 
always used to mean both strenuous toil and the condition of giving birth. State 
power made direct use of the ideological and biological imperatives of maternity 
in its immensely effective wartime propaganda campaign to recruit women labor-
ers and volunteers as well as male soldiers, using imagery of mothers and wives 
to impact both men and women. 
Brittain’s decision to be a nurse seems directly affected by this recruitment of 
women’s maternal labor. She chose to be a nurse rather than to volunteer for other 
forms of labor because she wanted to get as close to the war as possible, and because 
she believed herself well-suited to the maternal work of nursing. Meg Albrinck has 
usefully demonstrated how the state’s propaganda machine reinforced gender roles. 
Albrinck traces the emergence of a pro-natalist propaganda campaign aimed at re-
plenishing the diminishing male stock, embodied in such books as the 1918 Women 
Wanted, which “puts the very catchphrase that drew women into the factories into 
a new context” by adding the words “for maternity!” (276). Albrinck cites one of 
the most iconic propaganda posters: three figures, two adults, clearly female, and 
one child, all representing, potentially, a mother, wife, and daughter; they stand 
hugging one another and wrapped in shawls at an open window gazing on the 
backs of a departing group of soldiers in the distance. Above them an inscription 
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Fig. 1. - Propaganda’s portrayal of the maternal injunction to join the army (IWM Q70864) 
reads “Women of Britain Say—GO!” (275). A similar piece of propaganda with 
an even more commanding maternal overtone is the poster of the mother telling 
her son “Go—it’s your duty lad” (see fig. 1). Her extended, pointing arm, recall-
ing Kitchener’s pointed declaration “your country needs you,” lends the mother 
paternal authority, vesting the state with the immediate and uncontestable power 
of the mother, whose labor produces the raw material for war. The same trope was 
used for nursing recruitment posters, representing the mother as a hugely powerful 
and dominant figure, taking control of the male soldiers. 
Importantly, this maternal labor produces material goods in the bodies of babies. 
Brittain’s labor as a nurse is similarly concrete, mending damaged bodies generally 
so they can be returned to active service or cleared off the battlefield. Brittain always 
conceives herself when she is on active duty as nursing, by proxy, either her fiancé or 
her brother (166). Her transformation of every patient into Roland or Edward dem-
onstrates an ambiguous desire both to be with these beloved men and to overcome 
or overpower them at the physical level. In her maternal role as nurse, Brittain is thus 
exercising a kind of control over both the men she loves and the perilous situation of 
the war by giving herself the clear tasks of daily re-creating the physical conditions 
necessary for the war. Like the figures in the propaganda posters, Brittain can loom 
above the soldiers, and so the war, thus trumping political consideration of the world 
with the fundamental act of re-creating its conditions (see fig. 2). 
In subjecting herself to this self-effacing labor, Brittain ends up subjecting 
herself as much to the propaganda that encourages, and the rhetoric of the war 
that suggests, that “if a man cannot be useful to his country, he is better dead” 
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(89). The extent to which this 
propaganda figures in Brittain’s 
psychology cannot, of course, 
be precisely gauged, but it is 
remarkable that, after her close 
friend Victor (who had been, 
among Roland and Edward, 
one of the “Three Musketeers” 
of Uppingham Public School) 
is blinded, she almost imme-
diately hatches a plan to marry 
him for the sake of sacrificing 
her future for a lifetime of the 
extended labor of being a war 
nurse. 
The idea occurs to her when 
she learns one morning that 
another close friend, Geoffrey, 
has been killed. She remembers 
an advertisement she had cut 
out and sent to Roland two 
years earlier: “Lady, fiancé
killed, will gladly marry officer 
totally blinded or otherwise 
incapacitated by the war.” In 
the letter, she had commented: 
At first sight it is a little startling. Afterwards the tragedy of it 
dawn on you. The lady (probably more than a girl or she would 
have called herself ‘young lady’; they always do) doubtless has 
no particular gift or qualification, and does not want to face the 
dreariness of an unoccupied and unattached old-maidenhood. 
But the only person she loved is dead; all men are alike to her 
and it is a matter of indifference whom she marries, so she thinks 
she may as well marry someone who really needs her. The man, 
she thinks, being blind or maimed for life, will not have much 
opportunity of falling in love with anyone, and even if he does 
will not be able to say so. But he will need a perpetual nurse, 
and she if married to him can do more for him than an ordinary 
nurse and will perhaps find relief from her sorrow in devoting 
her life to him. Hence the advertisement; I wonder if anyone will 
answer it? It is purely a business arrangement, with an element 
of self-sacrifice which redeems it from udder sordidness. Quite 
an idea, isn’t it? (343-4) 
Thus, she meant lovelessly to marry Victor partially, as she admits, to guard her 
mourning for Roland. But the self-negation implied in self-sacrifice also appeals to 
Fig. 2 - Nurse as gigantic mother (IWM Q79858) 
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Fig. 3 - Nurses attending wounded soldiers in perambulators (IWM Q27814) 
her. The life she envisions for such a wife-nurse is completely reduced to physical 
labor. It collapses the distinction between private, individual care of the body, and 
the body as a commodity to be sold on the market. Brittain realizes, in retrospect 
that Victor’s death “probably saved [them] both from a relationship of which the 
serenity might have proved increasingly difficult to maintain” (359). 
Tthe complete reversal of her characteristics, from the independent college 
student to the universal mother and thoughtless caregiver, demonstrates the extent 
to which the necessity of raw, difficult labor effaces the individuality constructed 
through the cultural activity of work. The control this world-preserving labor has 
given her is an illusion that depends on the self-erasure she had fought against in 
escaping provincial Buxton. Her value in nursing or in marrying Victor for the 
sake of prolonging her nursing labor indefinitely is only a function of her working 
body; it is not fundamentally a manifestation of her self. In the photo of two nurses 
attending soldiers in perambulators, the power structure is necessarily confusing. 
The nurses loom above the infantilized men, whose bodies, used by the war, are 
the sites of constant labor and ministration from the healthy bodies of the women, 
who both serve and control (see fig. 3).
As Brittain looks back to the period after Victor’s death and her preparation 
for a third stint as a VAD, now headed for France where she will once again face 
imminent bodily danger, she reflects on the relation between her and her friends’
constant renewal of commitments and propaganda: “Between 1914 and 1919,” 
she writes “young men and women, disastrously pure in heart and unsuspicious 
of elderly self-interest and cynical exploitation, were continually re-dedicating 
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themselves […] to an end that they believed, and went on trying to believe, lofty 
and ideal” (370). What their rededication meant was a physical sacrifice to the 
state, a sacrifice that did not permit them to work constructively to contribute to 
their culture, nor to act and speak meaningfully to reshape the world. Indeed, the 
conditions of the nurse were much like the conditions of the soldier, and both were 
similar to the position of ideological impasse and imprisonment in which Brittain 
had been raised—one important difference being, however, that the demands of 
labor, of daily recreating the conditions of physical existence, obviated, mercifully, 
in Brittain’s case, the possibility of thought. Throughout the war, though especially 
at its start, she “longed intensely for hard physical labour which would give [her] 
discomfort to endure and weariness to put mental speculation to sleep” (146). 
iii. Action and Internationalism 
Brittain’s return to Oxford after the war constituted a time of trial and transformation 
in which, having lost her only friends to the war, she struggled to find meaning in 
the experiences that seemed of so little value to her classmates, who had been too 
young to experience it directly. But the war had propelled Brittain and her genera-
tion from the collectivity-based community structure that had made Edwardian life 
so uniform and enabled the mass physical sacrifice of labor for the war possible, 
to one based on the individual and individual needs. 
The individuality Brittain had to fight so hard for the opportunity to forge is 
now taken for granted. It is encouraged in almost as insidious a way, it seems, 
as it had been denied before the war. This move from what had seemed like the 
“we-based” culture of her youth to the “me-based” postwar culture of her young 
adulthood presents Brittain with a dilemma: how will she use the individuality to 
which the state, in Foucault’s terms, now addresses its power over the subject? 
Postwar, Brittain is set adrift from the tight control that her Edwardian youth and 
state service had enforced. In the atmosphere of that “thoroughly nasty Peace” 
(467) being waged in Paris, she observes “the hectic reactions of [her] generation, 
frantically dancing night after night […] in the vain hope of recapturing the lost 
youth that the war had stolen” (468-9). To make up for their sacrifices, Brittain 
observes, other survivors of the war turned to the hedonistic pursuit of individual 
pleasures that the exhausted moral state of England now permitted and, through 
the agency of postwar culture, encouraged. 
But Brittain has returned to Oxford under the internalized scrutiny of too many 
dead, measuring her actions against their lost lives, to enjoy the egotistical pleasures 
of individuality. She is admittedly, after four years of intentionally obliterating 
thought through the anodyne of labor, less than enthusiastic about returning to the 
thoughtful life and vegetative work of the student. The transition from labor back 
to work, as Brittain feared, was disastrous, for in finally having to think, she had 
to confront for the first time the utility and value of the deaths of her four close 
relations, the sacrifice of her youth, and the complete mental exhaustion that had 
left her in a state, essentially, of shell-shock. 
While Brittain was undeniably, as Badenhausen and others have shown, suffering 
from posttraumatic stress disorder, her descriptions of her mental breakdown at 
       	
            
 
           
        
       
             
         
 
         
          
              
 Riede 91 
Oxford revolve around a grief that is unresolved because it cannot attach significant 
use-value to its cause. In the months immediately following the war, when Brittain 
is able for the first time to think about the war in political terms, the conditions 
of the Treaty of Versailles seem to render the deaths of her relations and her own 
sacrificed years worthless: 
These negotiations […] did not seem to me to represent at all 
the kind of “victory” that the young men whom I had loved 
would have regarded as sufficient justification for their lost 
lives. Although they would no doubt have welcomed the idea 
of a League of Nations, Roland and Edward certainly had not 
died in order that Clemenceau should outwit Lloyd George, and 
both of them bamboozle President Wilson, and all three combine 
to make the beaten, blockaded enemy pay the cost of the War. 
For me the “Huns” were then, and always, the patient, stoical 
Germans whom I had nursed in France […] So when the text of 
the Treaty of Versailles was published in May […] I deliberately 
refrained from reading it; I was beginning already to suspect that 
my generation had been deceived, its young courage cynically 
exploited, its idealism betrayed, and I did not want to know the 
details of that betrayal. (470) 
This immediately precedes Brittain explaining that she had decided to switch her 
subject at Oxford from English to History because “[a]fter the first dismayed sense 
of isolation in an alien peace-time world, such rationality as I still possessed reas-
serted itself in a desire to understand how the whole calamity had happened” (471). 
The desire to understand the political past while ignoring the political future is 
a symptom of the melancholia that Badenhausen reads in Brittain’s text. Reading 
her melancholia through Freud’s 1917 delineation of “Mourning and Melancholia,” 
Badenhausen interprets Brittain as unable to “take on another object of desire” 
because “she wishes to remain faithful to those who have died (423). These first 
few years of melancholic stasis back at school are chronicled in a chapter called 
“Survivors Not Wanted,” which seethes with resentment at the lack of community 
and compassion Brittain confronted after her long ordeal. The students who have 
not shared her experience seem to partake still of an insular British world, which 
Brittain recognizes as feebly predicated on the assumption that larger historical 
and international political narratives cannot intervene. The incident that crystallizes 
Brittain’s inevitable disillusionment comes when she is asked, by her then-nemesis 
Winifred Holtby, to take part in a debate, arguing that travel and experience are more 
valuable than a University education. Feeling that she and her own international 
experience are on trial, she is enraged and humiliated when the younger students, 
who were not involved in the war, make light of her sacrificial labor, arguing for 
the more culturally insular academic experience, which now seems to Brittain so 
much vegetative, masturbatory self-involvement. 
Brittain represents this experience as traumatic because she felt isolated from 
those who had not experienced the labor, and its “exaltation” as she had. However, 
another hidden source of the trauma is the fear that her labor has been in vain. As 
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she had set out to nurse by proxy the four men she cared about, and they all died, 
her labor yields no use value, and the lost years that she dedicated to physically 
demanding labor appear unredeemed. Her poem ‘The Lament of the Demobilized,” 
published in Oxford Poetry in 1920, makes this point trenchantly: 
“You threw four years into the melting-pot—

Did you indeed!” these others cry. “Oh well,

The more fool you!”

And we’re beginning to agree with them. (467)
	
The old faith in the war that had sustained her, even in her most disillusioned moments, 
cannot stand up to this new perception that the war has meant nothing for her culture 
but destruction. It has not changed the world, and the labor she put into it merely 
did, as Arendt suggests labor must, balance back out to zero at the end of the day. 
The most remarkable manifestation of her trauma in these immediately postwar 
years, and the aspect of her story that has engendered the most scholarly work, 
also manifests itself in terms that uncannily mirror international politics. When 
confronted with the news of the death of yet another friend (from pneumonia) Brit-
tain writes that she “flung [herself] furiously into […] tennis parties, for I was sick 
beyond description of death and loss” (484), but this refusal to face loss and submit 
to becoming one of the Dionysian postwar revelers comes at a price: “I looked 
one evening into my bedroom glass and thought, with a sense of incommunicable 
horror, that I detected in my face the signs of some sinister and peculiar change. A
dark shadow seemed to lie across my chin; was I beginning to grow a beard, like a 
witch?” (484). Thus begins a year of hallucinations in which Brittain is tormented 
by mirrors: “the horrible delusion […] that my face was changing […] became a 
permanent, fixed obsession” (496). The darkly ironic climax to this disorder comes 
when Brittain is assigned a room at Oxford that contains five enormous mirrors. 
The room was assigned to Brittain because the bursar “was amusedly aware of 
that vain interest in clothes” for which Brittain was good-naturedly teased by her 
classmates (499). The room is “invaded at night by armies of large, fat mice,” and 
when Brittain has to enter the room, she writes, “I pressed my hands desperately 
against my eyes lest five identical witches’ faces should suddenly stare at me from 
the cold, remorseless mirrors” (500). 
Coming so soon after her disgusted reaction to the Treaty of Versailles, it is hard 
to miss the connection between Brittain’s personal hall of mirrors, invaded by bel-
licose mice, and Versailles’s Hall of Mirrors, invaded, as it was, by still bellicose 
statesmen intent on prolonging, rather than preventing, ongoing hostility. This 
personal hall of mirrors represents Brittain’s failure to experience the Lacanian 
mirror stage moment in which one recognizes the (false) unity of the subject in her 
own body. Brittain’s internal trauma is multiplied and reified by the geopolitical 
events in Versailles’s hall of mirrors that her own experience recreates at the per-
sonal level. What in Versailles is meant to be an act of international unity becomes 
an act of further breakdown and fragmentation, implying that the breakdown of 
the “European Civil War” has made reunification impossible. Likewise, Brittain’s 
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inability to achieve subjective unity in her hall of mirrors indicates the level of 
traumatic personal breakdown that has caught up to her after her years of supposedly 
thoughtless labor. This confrontation with a multiplied self, the self that, looking 
out, sees only a hideous distortion of itself looking back, is the pinnacle of Brittain’s 
traumatic isolation, and it compels Brittain to create community, to speak among 
and be recognized by others—she begins sleeping in Winifred Holtby’s room, 
and as the two women start working for the League of Nations, Brittain is able 
to develop a new identity through action as a professional internationalist pacifist 
speaking at public lectures on behalf of the League of Nations. 
Brittain’s specific notion of internationalism shows an eagerness to escape the 
racially “species-preserving” control of biological life that the state had so explic-
itly propagandized as the point of the war. Her commitment to internationalism, 
so at odds with the frivolous youth and the hedonistic survivors that she describes, 
certainly owes something to her specific experiences as a nurse to both British 
and German soldiers. She has been in a unique position to see that the state power 
that asserts its control over the subject by guaranteeing “protection of the species” 
fulfills the same political functions, and for the same reasons, from state to state. 
Brittain cannot, however, transcend the racial insularity into which she was born and 
brought up, and her own ideological limitations correspond to those of the League 
of Nations in which she is so invested. She has made a leap to the realm of action, 
what Arendt describes as taking part in a larger community in which people speak 
and interact among each other to “reveal actively their unique personal identities” 
(179). In the arena of action presented by the League of Nations, Brittain can act 
in a communal and not merely self-interested or vegetative way. It presents an op-
portunity to be with others not, as in the provincial pre-war paradigm, in a prison of 
constant surveillance, but in the ultimately fulfilling if utopian sense of whatArendt 
describes as the possibility of people being “with others and neither for nor against 
them” (180), and which Agamben elaborates in his utopian vision of the coming 
community in which people can cultivate, finally, an unmediated being together. 
Brittain’s advocacy of the League of Nations is as utopian as Arendt’s and 
Agamben’s theories of new communities that overcome competition, but she also 
demonstrates that the utopian vision of the League of Nations is complicit with the 
national and racial prejudices it claims to transcend. In an armistice day address to 
“children between 10 and 14” on the theme of “Good Citizenship and the League,” 
for instance, she wants to persuade the children that they must try to act as citizens 
of a world in which all nations are equal. She is also eager to point out, however, 
that this is a necessary result of the previous war, in which English men and women 
died to secure a world free from “the things that in 1914 Germany stood for, like 
overwhelming military despotism and the oppression of the weak” (6). Brittain is 
thus exemplary of the well-intentioned internationalists whose efforts were ulti-
mately connected to the coming war they tried so hard to avert. 
Brittain is limited by other racial and national ideologies of her time and place, 
as well. Julian Reid suggests that discourse can transcend the war that Foucault 
described as “just beneath the surface of peace” (qtd. in Reid 127) only by escaping 
the polemics that lead to war. Brittain’s recounting of her cosmopolitan adventure 
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ultimately reaffirms the “species-preserving” mandate of biopower, even while it 
demonizes that mandate’s immediate national ends. Brittain is sympathetic to the 
Germans, but in her analysis of the occupation of the Ruhr, she devolves into the 
partisan anger that undermines the efforts of the League of Nations. Furthermore, 
Brittain is repulsed by the mid-Western Americans with whom she must share a 
train compartment, and her undisguised disgust at their presence in what she seems 
to feel has become, by virtue of internationalist sympathy, her Europe, demonstrates 
the extent to which her politics are based on experience, and the use-values she 
connects to the trial that Europe, and not the USA, has endured. Other reports 
about the international figures that she observes also reveal entrenched stereo-
typical notions. For instance, she tellingly describes the Japanese ambassadoras 
possessing the “solemn impassivity of the oriental demeanor,” and concerned only 
with Japan—and this is at a time when Japan was practicing aggressive militarist 
colonialism in Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria (562). 
Brittain may have resolved her trauma through finding an international com-
munity in which to take action, but that action, like the League of Nations itself, is 
still subject to the old polemics. Brittain’s discourse ultimately reflects and partakes 
in these limitations. By occasionally undermining her own tentative resistance to 
the biopolitical structure of postwar England, Brittain’s narrative confirms the es-
sential irresistibility and inescapability of a power structure tried and strengthened 
in the same crucible as herself. Brittain’s movement through work, labor and action, 
however, is ground-breaking and reflects a modern progression that could, perhaps, 
only have been possible as part of the cataclysm of war that proved to be the telos 
of English imperial culture. 
Notes 
1 Jed Esty describes the ethnographic and culturally insular turn of interwar mod-
ernism in A Shrinking Island (2003). 
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